9.18.2004
Enemies in Iraq - when the going gets tough...
There are a number of opinion pieces out concerning the CIA's latest, largely negative assessment of the criminal violence in Iraq. As might be expected, some of them are down-right 'MoveOn'ish', and stress the Vietnam-like blunders America (read Bush) has fallen deep in to. A good example comes from the leftist magazine The Nation in a piece written byWilliam Greider.
Emphasize 'criminal' (above), because the insurgency (to use the popular word) is fractious, not based upon any legitimate goal, or backed by any legitimate governmental powerbase, with the obvious exceptions of Syria, Iran, and various other Arab dictatorships, which are all rather covert about it.
We are warned that violence will tend to spike upwards in the run-up to our own elections and the planned January elections in Iraq. We have expected this to happen.
The first thing to stress is that Iraq is not in "chaos," nor is there some general uprising against either Coalition forces or the interim government led by Ayad Allawi. If that were true, the violence would be far worse. The latest CIA assessment is negative, at least according to the spin of this week's news leaks, but given the agency's track record in Iraq that estimate may or may not be accurate. One clear CIA mistake has been its predictions of communal or religious fighting; the striking thing is how little Sunni vs. Shiite, or Kurd vs. Arab, violence there has been so far.
The second crucial point is that the Shiite majority remains committed both to elections and to a pluralistic Iraq. The moderate Grand Ayatollah Sistani is the recognized Shiite authority in Iraq, as his role in negotiating the recent Najaf ceasefire shows, and he has explicitly rejected the Iranian model of religious government. See this WSJ.com Opinion
From all appearances, the fledgling Iraqi government's chief impediments to a free society are the old Saddam secret police arm, the Fedayeen, and the Al Qeaeda-backed and inspired forces led by the long-time Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi, although more groups have been quantified. See wretchard's detailed article on the subject here. I am particularly concerned with the level of organization and determination found within the ranks of Saddam's old cronies, the Baathists.
Coalition forces and the interim Iraqi government erred twice in Fallujah, by not finishing the Sunni cleric Sadr - Mahdi army there. They have been permitted to survive and cause trouble another day. The only reason I can see is the timidity of the politicians. After all, the huge demonstrations there following the second 'uprising' were directed not at the Americans, but at the young Sadr and his, yes, criminal actions.
We understand that some parts of the Bush Administration are wary of provoking more violence before the election. But what would be truly damaging politically aren't further troubles in Iraq by themselves, but any perception that we aren't really fighting to win. See again the WSJ opinion.
We have shown time and again that the US is quite capable of standing in the gap. Now is not the time to be wishy-washy on the ground in Iraq.
Emphasize 'criminal' (above), because the insurgency (to use the popular word) is fractious, not based upon any legitimate goal, or backed by any legitimate governmental powerbase, with the obvious exceptions of Syria, Iran, and various other Arab dictatorships, which are all rather covert about it.
We are warned that violence will tend to spike upwards in the run-up to our own elections and the planned January elections in Iraq. We have expected this to happen.
The first thing to stress is that Iraq is not in "chaos," nor is there some general uprising against either Coalition forces or the interim government led by Ayad Allawi. If that were true, the violence would be far worse. The latest CIA assessment is negative, at least according to the spin of this week's news leaks, but given the agency's track record in Iraq that estimate may or may not be accurate. One clear CIA mistake has been its predictions of communal or religious fighting; the striking thing is how little Sunni vs. Shiite, or Kurd vs. Arab, violence there has been so far.
The second crucial point is that the Shiite majority remains committed both to elections and to a pluralistic Iraq. The moderate Grand Ayatollah Sistani is the recognized Shiite authority in Iraq, as his role in negotiating the recent Najaf ceasefire shows, and he has explicitly rejected the Iranian model of religious government. See this WSJ.com Opinion
From all appearances, the fledgling Iraqi government's chief impediments to a free society are the old Saddam secret police arm, the Fedayeen, and the Al Qeaeda-backed and inspired forces led by the long-time Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi, although more groups have been quantified. See wretchard's detailed article on the subject here. I am particularly concerned with the level of organization and determination found within the ranks of Saddam's old cronies, the Baathists.
Coalition forces and the interim Iraqi government erred twice in Fallujah, by not finishing the Sunni cleric Sadr - Mahdi army there. They have been permitted to survive and cause trouble another day. The only reason I can see is the timidity of the politicians. After all, the huge demonstrations there following the second 'uprising' were directed not at the Americans, but at the young Sadr and his, yes, criminal actions.
We understand that some parts of the Bush Administration are wary of provoking more violence before the election. But what would be truly damaging politically aren't further troubles in Iraq by themselves, but any perception that we aren't really fighting to win. See again the WSJ opinion.
We have shown time and again that the US is quite capable of standing in the gap. Now is not the time to be wishy-washy on the ground in Iraq.
// posted by HunterByrd @ 12:09 PM 
